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THE EVOLVING STANDARDS IN PRISON 
CONDITION CASES: AN ANALYSIS OF 
WILSON v. SEITER AND THE CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For nearly two centuries, United States courts failed to recog-
nize that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights could secure some 
rights for the incarcerated. Generally, the courts based their refusal 
to hear prisoner complaints on one or more of five rationales: the 
separation of powers doctrine, the low level of judicial expertise in 
penology, the fear that opening the courthouse doors to prisoners 
would result in a deluge of inmate litigation, and the view that 
federalism and comity should preclude considerations of the claims 
of state prisoners by federal courts.! It was not until the late 1960s 
and early 1970s that courts began to focus attention on the idea 
that prisoners might retain legal and constitutional rights while 
serving jail time. 2 In a 1974 decision, the United States Supreme 
Court began to accept the developing concept of prison rights, 
stating, "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution 
and the prisons of this country."3 
The general basis for a prisoner's claim of deprivation of con-
stitutional rights became 42 U.S.c. § 1983, the federal civil rights 
statute governing the deprivation of constitutional rights under the 
color of state law.4 Under § 1983, an individual must show that a 
I Kenneth C. Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis of the Decline in the 
"Hands-Off" Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 795, 797-98 (1977). 
2 See Angel Castillo, The Legal Rights of Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,1991, at A18. 
3 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). The Wolff court, however, also 
recognized that prisoners' rights are subject to some restrictions because of the nature of 
confinement. Id. at 556. 
4 The relevant provision of § 1983 reads: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceedings for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1991). Although § 1983 was enacted by Congress in 1871, this 
section lay dormant until 1961, when the Supreme Court held that § 1983 extended to 
government officials acting under color of state law, and that public officials may be liable 
for Fourteenth Amendment violations. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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right protected by the Constitution has been violated and that the 
deprivation or violation was effected under the "color of state law."5 
Although prisoners may allege deprivations of the First, Fifth, 
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, the Eighth Amendment has 
been the most frequent basis for prisoners' civil rights actions.6 
Lawsuits involving the conditions of a particular prisoner's con-
finement are raised under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause. Although the Supreme Court first 
applied the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause only to depri-
vations specifically imposed as part of the prison sentence, the Court 
acknowledged in 1976 that this constitutional provision could also 
be applied to some deprivations that were suffered during impris-
onment.7 Today, the Eighth Amendment is recognized as proscrib-
ing far more than physically barbarous conditions and punishments; 
it prohibits any deprivation that may deny prisoners the minimal 
civilized measure of life's necessities. 8 
Since then, the Supreme Court has issued numerous decisions defining the precise scope of 
liability under § 1983. See generally Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 
i983 Litigation, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1982) (discussing the scope of § 1983 liability through an 
examination of the statutory language of § 1983, the history and policy of the statute, and 
case law). 
5 See generally HON. GEORGE C. PRATT ET AL., SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
1985: DEVELOPMENTS, TRENDS, AND PROBLEMS 567-70 (1985) (discussing the "under color of 
law" requirement of § 1983). 
6 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment is applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660 (1962). 
7 See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
8 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). For historical information on 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, see generally Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969). The Framers 
of the Eighth Amendment sought, as its words suggest, to prevent judges and legislators 
from imposing on citizens barbarous or cruel and unusual forms of punishment. [d. Con-
sequently, the Eighth Amendment has long been thought to prohibit such inhuman punish-
ment as torture, lingering death, drawing and quartering, disemboweling, and burning at 
the stake. See in re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-
36 (1878). In recent years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause in a flexible and dynamic manner that reaches beyond the extreme 
physical punishments proscribed in early United States history. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 171 (1976). Today, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits punish-
ments or prison conditions that, although not physically barbarous, "involve the unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain." [d. at 173. Not all prison conditions, however, trigger Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny. Only deprivations of the basic necessities of life - such as food, medical 
care, sanitation, and physical safety - violate the intent of Eighth Amendment protections. 
See Wilson v. Seiter, III S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19 
(1986); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 679 (1978). 
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In 1981, the Supreme Court directly addressed the problem of 
prison conditions for the first time in Rhodes v. Chapman.9 The 
Court's decision, however, illustrated a tension among the Justices. 
The majority in Rhodes held that prison conditions must evidence 
"wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain" to qualify for relief 
under the Eighth Amendment, indicating that a subjective compo-
nent of malice or irresponsibility may need to be proven by a 
prisoner. 1O In his concurrence, however, Justice Brennan reasoned 
that only an objective determination regarding the actual conditions 
of the prisoner's incarceration should resolve the case. ll Thus, after 
Rhodes, the law remained unclear as to whether a successful prison 
condition claim under the Eighth Amendment was to turn on prison 
conditions themselves, the knowledge or intent of those responsible 
for administering the prison system, or both. 12 
In a 1991 case, Wilson v. Seiter, the Supreme Court attempted 
to resolve this uncertainty in the law. 13 Wilson involved an Ohio 
prison inmate's alleged claim that certain conditions of his confine-
ment violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In a five 
to four decision, the Supreme Court held that in order for a pris-
oner to prove that the conditions of confinement constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment, the prisoner must show "deliberate in-
difference" on the part of the officials toward prison conditions as 
well as the objective deprivation due to the condition or conditions 
present within the prison. 14 
Although a new and perhaps clearer test for evaluating Eighth 
Amendment prison condition claims was articulated in Wilson, the 
decision was closely divided and the majority's opinion left some 
questions unanswered. This Note critically examines the Wilson de-
cision and forecasts its likely impact on Eighth Amendment prison 
condition cases in the future. Part II of the Note analyzes and 
discusses the majority and concurring opinions of Wilson. Part III 
examines lower court decisions concerning the conditions of 
9452 U.S. at 337. Until this case, the Court had not heard an argument concerning 
whether the conditions of confinement at a particular prison constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment and had not addressed the principles relevant to assessing such claims. 
10 [d. at 346. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (discussing further the Su-
preme Court's holding in Rhodes v. Chapman). 
II [d. at 362-69 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
12 See James Rosenzweig, Comment, State Prison Conditions and the Eighth Amendment: What 
Standard for Reform Under Section 1983?, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 411, 412-20 (1987) (discussing 
the application and standards of Rhodes). 
13 IllS. Ct. 2321. 
14 [d. at 2326-27. 
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confinement prior to Wilson, focusing in particular on the tensions 
in the lower courts surrounding the necessity of an intent require-
ment and the application of the totality of the conditions approach. 
Part IV critically discusses the impact of the Wilson decision and 
forecasts how the "deliberate indifference" requirement will be de-
fined and applied by lower courts. This analysis concludes that, 
while the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson by no means precludes 
a jurisprudence of penal reform that is responsive to the many 
deprivations in the V nited States prison system, the ambiguity re-
maining after Wilson for the resolution of prison condition cases in 
lower courts virtually ensures that a uniform or coherent jurispru-
dence will remain for the present an elusive dream. 
II. OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF WILSON V. SEITER 
A. Case History 
Pearly L. Wilson, a prison inmate at Hocking Correctional Fa-
cility (HCF) in Nelsonville, Ohio, filed suit against the director of 
the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and the warden of HCF 
under 42 V.S.C. § 1983. Wilson alleged that certain conditions of 
his confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment in vio-
lation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 15 
In support of his claim of cruel and unusual punishment, Wil-
son's complaint alleged overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient 
locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper 
ventilation, unclean and inadequate rest rooms, unsanitary dining 
facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and phys-
ically ill inmates. 16 In addition to describing the conditions in detail, 
Wilson's affidavits charged that the Ohio authorities, after notifi-
cation, had failed to take remedial action. 17 Respondent's affidavits 
denied that some of the alleged conditions existed and described 
efforts by prison officials to improve other conditions. IS 
Both the Federal District Court in Ohio and the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit focused on the prison officials' 
15 [d. at 2322-23. 
16 [d. at 2323. 
17 [d. 
18 [d. 
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culpable states of mind when ruling on Wilson's claim. 19 In its 
decision, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the prison officials because Wilson failed to prove obduracy and 
wantonness on behalf of the prison officials.20 The Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.21 In so 
ruling, the court of appeals held that the officials' culpable states of 
mind should be gauged by whether the officials' behavior was 
"marked by persistent malicious cruelty."22 Because Wilson had not 
shown that the conditions at the Ohio state prison were motivated 
by malice on the part of the prison officials toward inmates such as 
himself, the court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment in 
favor of the prison officials.23 
B. Majority Opinion 
The questions presented to the Supreme Court in the Wilson 
appeal involved whether a prisoner claiming that conditions of 
confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment must show 
a culpable state of mind on the part of prison officials and, if so, 
what state of mind was required.24 Three prior Supreme Court 
decisions illustrate how the Wilson majority answered these ques-
tions and arrived at its holding: Estelle v. Gamble,25 Rhodes v. Chap-
man,26 and Whitley v. Albers.27 These prisoners' rights decisions con-
struing the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
19 Wilson, who was represented by the National Prison Project of the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), argued that officials' states of mind should be irrelevant in prison 
condition cases. See Ruth Marcus, Court Raises Burden in Prison Lawsuits, WASH. POST, June 
18,1991, at A4. The ACLU asserted that the conditions inmates must endure while in prison 
may be cruel and unusual regardless of whether they are spawned by malice, deliberate 
indifference, or neglect. Id. The United States Justice Department joined the ACLU in 
supporting Wilson's position, reasoning that the failure of the government to meet inmates' 
basic human needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment whether or not fault could 
clearly be ascribed to the particular officials responsible for running the facility. Id. 
20 Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 862--63 (6th Cir. 1990), vacated, III S. Ct. 2321 (1991). 
21Id. at 867. 
22Id. This standard for determining culpable state of mind followed the reasoning and 
measure of intent defined in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). See infra notes 40-43 
and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding in Whitley) . 
.. Wilson, 893 F.2d at 867. 
24 III S. Ct. at 2322. 
25 See generally 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
26 See generally 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
27 See generally 475 U.S. 213 (1986). 
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Clause provided the framework for the majority's decision in Wil-
son.28 
Estelle v. Gamble was the first case in which the Court recognized 
that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause could be applied to some conditions suffered during im-
prisonment.29 The Estelle Court emphasized that only prison con-
ditions incompatible with "evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of society," or that involve "the unnecessary and wan-
ton infliction of pain" implicate the Eighth Amendment.30 In Estelle, 
the Court rejected an inmate's claim that a prison doctor had in-
flicted cruel and unusual punishment by inadequately attending to 
his medical needs3! because the inmate failed to establish that the 
prison doctor possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind.32 The 
Court held that a prisoner advancing such a claim must prove 
"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" to establish the 
requisite culpable state of mind.33 In any medical condition case 
brought by a prisoner after Estelle, an official's culpable state of 
mind had to be proven by a plaintiff under the standard of delib-
erate indifference. 
In Rhodes v. Chapman, prison inmates contended that the lodg-
ing of two inmates in a single cell constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.34 Although cases prior to Rhodes clearly indicated that 
prison conditions were subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny, the 
Court had not squarely been confronted with a challenge requiring 
it to articulate "the principles relevant to assessing claims that con-
ditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment."35 In Rhodes, 
28 Justice Scalia, who authored the majority opinion in Wilson v. Seiter, was joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter. 
29 Prior to this decision, the Supreme Court had found only the Eighth Amendment 
applicable to deprivations that were specifically part of the sentence. See, e.g., Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 152 (1976) (imposition of death penalty under Georgia statute not held to 
be cruel and unusual punishment). 
30 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-06. In determining that the Eighth Amendment prohibited 
wanton infliction of pain, Estelle relied on Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, and Francis v. Resweber, 
329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
31 The inmate in Estelle was examined by medical personnel on seventeen occasions 
during a three-month span as a result of an injury obtained while performing prison work. 
429 U.S. at 99-101. He alleged that the failure to perform an X-ray or to use additional 
diagnostic techniques constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. 
32 [d. at 105-06. 
33 [d. at 104. 
34 453 U.S. 337, 339-43 (1981). 
35 [d. at 345 (emphasis added). 
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the Court found that no "static test" could exist for courts to deter-
mine whether particular conditions of confinement were cruel and 
unusual, but reemphasized that these conditions must both involve 
"the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain."36 Thus, wanton 
and unnecessary infliction of pain became the one element certain 
to be implicated in all Eighth Amendment challenges to unwanted 
prison conditions. 
In Rhodes, the majority rejected the inmate's claim, concluding 
that while the plaintiff may have proven that double ceIling inflicts 
pain, he did not sufficiently establish any "unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain."37 Although the majority's opinion suggested that 
some kind of subjective element may need to be proven, it was 
unclear as to whether a showing of intent was essential and, if so, 
what type of intent must be proven. In his concurring opinion, 
however, Justice Brennan supported an interpretation of the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause in Eighth Amendment challenges 
that required only careful objective scrutiny of the conditions at 
issue and the application of realistic, humane standards.38 The 
vagueness of the majority's opinion coupled with the clarity of 
Brennan's concurrence led to a division in the lower courts over 
the appropriate standard to use in Eighth Amendment prison con-
dition cases.39 
In Whitley v. Albers, an inmate was shot by a guard during an 
attempt to quell a prison disturbance.4o The prisoner alleged that 
he had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.41 As in 
Estelle and Rhodes, the Whitley Court emphasized that, after incar-
ceration, "only the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' ... 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth 
Amendment."42 Stressing that prison officials often have to make 
quick, difficult decisions during prison disturbances, the Court held 
that whether unnecessary and wanton pain was inflicted in any 
particular instance ultimately turned on whether the force was ap-
plied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline or 
36Id. at 346-47. 
37 !d. at 347-48. 
38Id. at 364 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
39 See infra notes 69-92 and accompanying text (discussing the disagreement among 
lower courts surrounding the need for an intent requirement). 
40 475 U.S. 312, 314-16 (1986). 
41Id. 
42Id. at 319. 
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"maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing 
harm."43 Thus, in cases involving force in prisons, an official's intent 
must be measured by the "malicious and sadistic" standard. 
Based on the rulings in these prior prisoners' rights cases, it 
was evident that the Court had not settled whether proof of culpable 
state of mind would be necessary in all Eighth Amendment post-
conviction cases. Estelle and Whitley did resolve the need to prove a 
culpable state of mind in medical cases and in cases involving actions 
of force by prison guards against inmates. However, when the Court 
faced the specific question of determining Eighth Amendment 
rights in prison condition cases in Rhodes, the Court's holding re-
sulted in vague and unsettled standards. In Wilson, the majority 
opinion interpreted Estelle, Rhodes, and Whitley as establishing ob-
jective and subjective components for measuring prisoners' claims 
of cruel and unusual prison conditions. The objective component 
requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the seriousness of the depriva-
tion-that the conditions to which the inmate was subjected de-
prived that inmate of basic human needs. The subjective component 
requires the plaintiff to present some evidence concerning the of-
ficial's state of mind-that the official acted with some form of intent 
toward the conditions in the prison. 
The Wilson Court held that the holdings in Estelle, Rhodes, and 
Whitley, and the Court's reliance on the statement "no wanton in-
fliction of pain," made the prison official's state of mind pertinent 
in all Eighth Amendment prison condition cases.44 Although the 
Court in Wilson concluded that the holding in Rhodes turned on the 
objective component of the plaintiff's claim, not the subjective com-
ponent, it held that the later holding in Whitley had clarified that 
43Id. at 320-21. Deliberate indifference was not held to be an appropriate standard 
because it did not adequately capture the importance of ensuring the safety of prisoners and 
officials in the face of violence, and because these decisions must be made in haste, without 
the luxury of a second chance. Id. 
44 Wilson v. Seiter, III S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991). The Supreme Court has defined 
"wanton" as follows: 
Wanton means reckless-without regard to the rights of others .... Wantonly means 
causelessly, without restraint, and in reckless disregard of the rights of others. 
Wantonness is defined as a licentious act of one man toward the person of another, 
without regard to his rights; it has also been defined as the conscious failure by one 
charged with a duty to exercise due care and diligence to prevent an injury after 
the discovery of the peril, or under circumstances where he is charged with a 
knowledge of such peril, and being conscious of the inevitable or probable results 
of such failure. 
Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Smith v. Wade, 
461 U.S. 30 (1982)). 
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Rhodes had not eliminated the subjective component of Eighth 
Amendment claims.45 The majority in Wilwn stressed that Whitley 
unequivocally stated that obduracy and wantonness, not inadver-
tence or good faith error, characterize the conduct prohibited by 
the Eighth Amendment, whether such conduct occurs in "connec-
tion with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical 
needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock."46 
The majority in Wilwn also rejected the inmate's argument that 
a distinction should be drawn between "short-term" conditions-in 
which a state of mind requirement would apply-and "continuing" 
or "systematic" conditions of confinement-where the official's state 
of mind would be irrelevant.47 The plaintiff's basis for advancing 
this argument makes intuitive sense: long-term conditions are the 
kind of persistent conditions officials have notice of on a daily, 
weekly or even yearly basis. Because the officials were or should 
have been on notice, they have presumably intended to ignore the 
conditions. In rejecting this contention, the majority reasoned that 
the intent requirement articulated in Estelle and Whitley was not a 
matter of policy or predilection of the Court, but rather was man-
dated by the language of the Eighth Amendment itself, which pro-
hibits only cruel and unusual punishment.48 Although the Court did 
acknowledge that "continuous" and "systematic" conditions would 
likely make it easier to establish intent on the part of prison officials, 
the majority opinion found no logical reason why these types of 
conditions should entirely obviate the requirement of intent.49 
Having determined that the Eighth Amendment did require 
an inquiry into the state of mind of prison officials, the Court sought 
to establish what exact state of mind must be shown in order to 
45 Wilson, III S. Ct. at 2324. 
46 [d. (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). 
47 III S. Ct. at 2325. 
48 [d. at 2325-26. In discussing the significance behind this clause and the word "pun-
ishment", the Court quoted judge Posner: 
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. This 
is what the word means today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century .... 
[I]f [a] guard accidently stepped on [a] prisoner's toe and broke it, this would not 
be punishment in anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the word [pun-
ishment], whether we consult the usage of 1791, or 1868 or 1985. 
Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986). 
See also johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) ("The thread common to all 
[Eighth Amendment prison cases] is that 'punishment' has been deliberately administered 
for a penal or disciplinary purpose .... "), cm. denied sub nom. john v. johnson, 414 U.S. 
1033 (1973). 
49 Wilson, III S. Ct. at 2325. 
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satisfy a plaintiff's burden of proof in cases challenging prison 
conditions. Although the Court found that precedent mandated 
that the offending conduct must fairly be characterized as "wanton," 
Whitley made it clear that wantonness does not have a fixed mean-
ing.50 The Court further found that the state of mind prescribed 
by the appeals court in Wilson v.Seiter and the Supreme Court in 
Whitley-that an official's actions must be undertaken maliciously 
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm-could not 
apply to prison condition cases. The malicious state of mind re-
quired under the Whitley standard would be too demanding for 
cases involving only the conditions of confinement.51 A prison of-
ficial's reaction to prison conditions, unlike prison disturbances, 
does not require the officials to make quick and difficult decisions 
during dangerous or heated situations. 
Finding the Whitley standard of intent inappropriate in prison 
condition cases, the Court held that the "deliberate indifference" 
standard articulated in Estelle would be a more suitable standard. 52 
In arriving at this decision, the Court postulated that, unlike cases 
in which prisoners allege specific malicious conduct toward them 
on the part of prison officials, there is "no significant distinction 
between claims alleging inadequate medical care and those alleging 
inadequate 'conditions of confinement."'53 After Wilson, conditions 
of confinement violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment only if they involve a serious deprivation 
of basic necessities and result from an official's deliberate indiffer-
ence. 
C. Concurring Opinion 
Although the four concurring Justices54 agreed that the stan-
dard of malicious intent was too high in prison condition cases, they 
did not agree with either the majority'S analysis of precedent or 
with the standards the majority set in its holding. The concurrence 
held that the majority's intent requirement was inconsistent with 
50Id. at 2326 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 318, for the proposition that wantonness does 
not have a fixed meaning, but must be "determined with due regard for differences in the 
kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged"). 
51 Wilson, III S. Ct. at 2326. 
52Id. 
58 /d. The Court then remanded the case to be decided under the standards it had 
established. Id. at 2328. 
M Justice White, who authored the concurring opinion, was joined by Justices Marshall, 
Blackmun and Stevens. 
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prior Supreme Court decisions and that only the objective severity 
of the contested conditions of confinement should be evaluated 
when determining whether a particular condition of confinement 
is cruel and unusua1.55 These Justices felt that the majority's decision 
would result in serious deprivations of basic human needs-needs 
that would likely go unredressed due to "an unnecessary and mean-
ingless search for 'deliberate indifference."'56 The concurrence dis-
agreed with the majority's argument that "[i]f the pain inflicted is 
not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing 
judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting 
officer before it can qualify [as a violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment]."57 The concurrence argued that the majority's reasoning 
departed from the Supreme Court's prior decisions in this area in 
which "[the Court] has made it clear that the conditions are them-
selves part of the punishment. "58 
In support of its argument, the concurrence relied on prior 
Supreme Court decisions based specifically on challenges to condi-
tions of confinement: Hutto v. Finney59 and Rhodes v. Chapman.6o 
Hutto v. Finney involved a district court's remedial order to limit the 
punitive isolation of inmates to thirty days. The lower court found 
that the conditions of a more lengthy confinement in isolation cells 
violated the Eighth Amendment.61 In upholding the lower court's 
limitation on punitive isolation, the Supreme Court focused only on 
the objective conditions of confinement, holding that the lower court 
was correct to conclude that the conditions of lengthy detention in 
isolation cells violated prohibitions against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.62 
55 See Wilson, III S. Ct. at 2328-31 (White, J., concurring). 
561d. at 2331. 
571d. at 2328. 
5Sld. 
59 See generally 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
60 See generally 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
61 Hutto, 437 U.S. at 682-84. In Hutto, confinement in punitive isolation was for an 
indeterminate period of time. /d. at 683. An average of four, though sometimes as many as 
ten or eleven, prisoners were crowded into a windowless eight by eleven foot cell containing 
no furniture other than a source of water and a toilet that could only be flushed outside the 
cell. ld. Prisoners received mattresses at night which often contained infectious diseases. ld. 
Their meals consisted primarily of a four-inch square of "gruel," a substance created by 
mashing meat, potatoes, oleo, syrup, vegetables, eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking 
the mixture in a pan. ld. 
6·ld. at 685-88. The Court failed to set any standard for determining when prison 
conditions were cruel and unusual. ld. It was unnecessary for the Court to do so because the 
prison officials admitted the conditions were cruel and unusual and because the officials 
challenged only the thirty day limit. ld. 
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The concurrence also relied upon Rhodes, but it disagreed with 
the majority's interpretation. The concurrence agreed that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits only punishments that involve "un-
necessary and wanton infliction of pain."63 However, the concur-
rence argued that Rhodes required Eighth Amendment prison con-
dition challenges to be treated as challenges to punishments that 
are formally meted out by statute or by a sentencing judge.64 That 
is, courts are to examine only the objective severity of the plaintiff's 
situation, not the subjective intent of the officials who placed the 
plaintiff in that situation.65 In addition, the concurrence felt that 
Whitley better supported an objective standard for challenges to 
conditions of confinement than a standard requiring the showing 
of a culpable state of mind. To support this reasoning, the concur-
rence pointed to parts of the Whitley opinion that the majority had 
overlooked when writing its opinion. In Whitley, the Court stated 
that "an express intent to inflict unnecessary pain is not required," 
and that harsh conditions of confinement may constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment unless such conditions are part of the penalty 
that criminals must pay for their offenses against society.66 The 
concurrence felt that these selections from the Whitley decision sup-
ported the conclusion that intent should not be a requirement in 
prison condition cases. 
The concurrence also indicated that the majority's intent re-
quirement would be difficult or impossible to apply in cases where 
inhumane prison conditions were the result of "cumulative action 
and inaction by numerous officials inside and outside a prison, 
sometimes over a long period of time."67 Under these situations, it 
would be unclear as to whose intent should be examined-the 
prison guards, the administration, prison officials or legislatures 
that provide funding to prisons.68 
Based on these arguments, the concurrence reasoned that only 
the objective deprivations and conditions in a prison need be 
63 Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321,2329 (1991) (White, j., concurring). 
64 [d. at 2329-30. 
65 [d. 
66 475 U.S. 312,319 (1986). The concurrence in Wilson classified the language that the 
Wilson majority relied upon in Whitley as dicta. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2320 (White, j., concur-
ring). 
67 Wilson,> 111 S. Ct. at 2330 (White, j., concurring). 
68 /d. The concurrence was disturbed by the fact that the majority left § 1983 claims 
open to the possibility that officials could defeat a claim by showing that the conditions were 
caused by insufficient funding. /d. at 2330-31. See infra notes 170-188 and accompanying 
text (discussing the "cost defense" and its impact on prison condition cases). 
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analyzed to determine whether conditions within a prison are in 
violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Regardless 
of whether the concurrence's interpretation follows more naturally 
from the Court's prior holdings in the area of prison conditions, it 
is the majority's opinion that sets the standards for further cases. 
Before discussing the likely ramifications of the Wilson doctrine in 
future cases, it is useful to consider disagreements present in lower 
courts prior to Wilson in order to gain a more thorough understand-
ing of what was at stake in the resolution of Wilson v. Seiter. 
III. LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSE 
A. Objective Severity versus the Need to Establish Intent 
Before the Wilson decision, no uniform interpretation of the 
application of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause existed among the lower courts in prison condition 
cases. Lower courts disagreed as to whether an intent requirement 
was necessary and, if so, how the intent requirement was to be 
defined. Some circuit courts held that only objective standards re-
quired examination,69 while others placed weight on the intent of 
the officials in addition to the objective severity of the conditions.70 
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Wilson, the Sixth Cir-
cuit had held that an official's intent must be examined in Eighth 
Amendment prison condition claims.7l In Birrell v. Brown, the court 
held that, in addition to producing evidence of seriously inadequate 
69 See, e.g., Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 427-38 (3rd Cir. 1990) (finding a determi-
nation of the conditions was all that was necessary in Eighth Amendment prison condition 
cases), cere. denied, 112 S. Ct. 242 (1991); Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir. 
1987) (finding the Supreme Court has not made intent an element of cases alleging uncon-
stitutional prison conditions); Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52, 54-55 (5th Cir. 1987) (prison 
condition cases do not require a showing that officials acted with malicious or sadistic intent); 
French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (7th Cir. 1985), cere. denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986). 
70 See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 867 (6th. Cir. 1990) (holding prisoners must 
prove official's behavior was "marked by persistent malicious cruelty"), vacated, III S. Ct. 
2321 (1991); Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding prisoners must 
establish that inadequate conditions are the result of recklessness by the prison officials); 
Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414, 415-16 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that wanton or obdurate 
disregard of, or deliberate indifference to, a prisoner's right to life as a condition of con-
finement must be established); Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 
(1st Cir. 1988) (holding prisoners must prove officials are deliberately indifferent to the 
health and safety of prisoners). 
71 Birrell, 867 F.2d at 957-59. 
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and indecent surroundings,72 a prisoner must also establish that the 
conditions are "the result of recklessness by prison officials and not 
mere negligence or oversight."73 It was the Sixth Circuit that orig-
inally heard Wilson v. Seiter on appeal. 74 In its decision, the Sixth 
Circuit went so far as to require the plaintiff to show that officials 
had acted "maliciously and sadistically" in imposing and neglecting 
the challenged conditions.75 Although several other circuits recog-
nized some form of intent requirement in prison condition cases, 
the Sixth Circuit was the only circuit to apply this demanding stan-
dard as a measure of an official's culpable state of mind.76 
In addition, some circuits prior to Wilson required a showing 
of intent on the part of prison officials when conditions inside the 
prison threatened the health and safety of prisoners. In Jackson v. 
State of Arizona, a prisoner complained that the unsanitary handling 
of food and polluted water at the prison could lead to death and 
all types of diseases among the prison population.77 In this case, the 
Ninth Circuit held that if the prison conditions were as threatening 
to the prisoner's health and safety as he alleged, and "if they were 
the result of deliberate indifference on the part of the prison official," 
then the prisoner had established conditions amounting to cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.78 The Sev-
enth Circuit followed a similar rationale.79 In Santiago v. Lane, a 
prisoner suffered two brutal attacks at the hands of fellow inmates, 
and he alleged that these attacks were the result of officials' failures 
to take certain precautions to ensure the safety of prisoners.8o The 
Seventh Circuit held that the prisoners must be able to prove that 
the prison officials were deliberately indifferent toward the safety 
of a prisoner in order to argue successfully that his Eighth Amend-
ment rights were violated.8l The court, relying upon an earlier case 
72 [d. at 957. The prisoner's complaint described a facility in need of serious repairs. He 
alleged that the prison was an unsanitary and dangerous place to live, that the buildings 
were fire and asbestos hazards, that the roof leaked, that there was only one shower for 
forty-five prisoners, and that insects and vermin were present. [d. 
73 [d. at 958. 
74 Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). 
75 [d. at 866. 
76 See Martin A. Swartz, The Decision on Prison Conditions, 206 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1991). 
77 885 F.2d 639, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1989). 
78 [d. at 641 (emphasis added). After determining that some of the claims could arguably 
amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the court remanded the case. [d. 
79 See generally Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1990). 
80 [d. at 218-19. 
8} [d. at 220-21. 
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in the Seventh Circuit, held that the deliberate indifference stan-
dard articulated in Estelle v. Gamble82 had been extended "to impose 
upon both federal and state correctional officers and officials the 
obligation to protect inmates from violence at the hands of other 
inmates. "83 These cases illustrate several circuits' applications and 
interpretations of the intent requirement in Eighth Amendment 
cases dealing with the many conditions found within the prison 
environment. 
Other circuits, however, specifically stated or implied that only 
the deprivations within the prison were to be demonstrated in cases 
challenging existing prison conditions. In Gillespie v. Crawford, the 
Fifth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court had held that only 
the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" upon an inmate 
violates the Eighth Amendment.84 In its decision, the Fifth Circuit 
held that the standard to determine whether pain suffered by an 
inmate was properly characterized as "unnecessary and wanton" 
depended upon the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amend-
ment objection was lodged.85 The Gillespie court reasoned that con-
ditions of confinement, as well as medical care and security mea-
sures, can involve "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."86 
The court held, however, that unlike conduct that does not purport 
to be imposed as punishment, as was the case in Estelle and Whitley, 
the Supreme Court "has not made intent an element of a cause of 
action alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement."87 Un-
der the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause, prison conditions could have violated the 
Eighth Amendment even if they were neither known to the officials 
nor imposed with a conscious desire to inflict pain or punishment.88 
The Third Circuit, prior to Wilson, also based its decisions in 
prison condition cases on the objective conditions in prisons. In 
Tillery v. Owen, the court found that cruel and unusual punishment 
82 Id. at 221 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding deliberate indifference 
by prison officials to a prisoner's serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment». 
83 Santiago, 894 F.2d at 221 (quoting Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
84 833 F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976». 
85 Gillespie, 833 F.2d at 49. In Gillespie, the prisoner alleged that inmates were unconsti-
tutionally housed in crowded and unheated conditions. Id. at 48. In addition, the prisoner 
alleged that the cells had inadequate lighting and ventilation and that they were dirty and 
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was to be measured by "the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society," and that the Eighth Amend-
ment is violated only where an inmate is deprived of a "minimal 
civilized measure of life's necessities."89 The Third Circuit did not 
require a showing of intent to determine whether an inmate had 
been deprived of any basic need. Instead, the Third Circuit focused 
on the conditions themselves to provide the evidence needed to 
prove that an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights had been vio-
lated.90 
In examining the disagreements among the lower courts, it is 
apparent that the courts generally agreed that conditions themselves 
must constitute serious deprivations to make out a claim of cruel 
and unusual punishment. The courts, however, did not agree on 
whether to require proof of intent. The decision in Wilson put to 
rest this division among the lower courts. Prisoners must now show 
a culpable state of mind on behalf of prison officials, measured by 
the standard of "deliberate indifference."91 
B. Totality of the Conditions Approach 
Another subject of disagreement among the lower courts prior 
to Wilson centered on the "totality of the conditions approach"-an 
analysis in which the courts examine the cumulative impact of con-
ditions of incarceration to determine whether the conditions con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment.92 Under this approach, if a 
court does not find that a specific condition constitutes a violation 
of the Eighth Amendment, it may instead find that several of the 
complained-of conditions, in the aggregate, result in the infliction 
of punishment which is cruel and unusual,93 
The totality of the conditions approach was first developed in 
the lower federal courts.94 The viability of this approach, however, 
89 907 F.2d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 343 (1991) (quoting Rhodes 
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1981)). 
90 Tillery, 907 F.2d at 435-39. See infra notes 137-143 and accompanying text. 
91 Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). 
92 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362-63 (1981) (Brennan, j., concurring). 
9. See Stacia E. Reynolds, Note, Hanging in the Balance: Ninth Circuit Analysis of Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause, 21 WILLAMETTE L. REV., 306, 307-08 (1985). One alternative to 
the totality approach was for courts to examine each condition separately and determine if 
a specific deprivation of human needs was present in the prison as a result of that particular 
condition. 
94 The first totality analysis was undertaken in Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. 
Ark. 1970), afl'd., 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). In Holt, prisoners contended that the overall 
conditions in the prison amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. [d. at 373. The court 
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was strengthened in the Supreme Court's holding in Rhodes v. Chap-
man. In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court noted that "con-
ditions . . . alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the 
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities."95 Unfortunately, the 
Court did not address the intricacies of the totality of the conditions 
approach.96 Instead, the majority simply interlaced its opinion with 
the indicia of a totality test, finding that no static test could be used 
to determine whether the conditions of confinement constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment.97 Interestingly, Justice Brennan's concur-
rence stated that "[the Court] today adopts the totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances test."98 By addressing the totality approach in this man-
ner, the Court added considerable weight to the efficacy of this 
approach, but failed to tell the courts how or when to use it. 
Although the Supreme Court indicated its support for the 
totality approach in Rhodes, a division existed among the lower 
courts concerning the acceptance and application of this approach.99 
Some courts examined the totality of the challenged conditions to 
determine. whether the cumulative effect of the prison conditions 
held that "[t]he distinguishing aspects of Arkansas penitentiary life must be considered 
together." ld. All conditions "exist in combination; each affects the other; and taken together 
they have a cumulative impact on the inmates." ld. 
95 Rhodes, 452 V.S. at 341. The majority maintained that the prison was a modern, well-
equipped and well-staffed facility. Because the challenged condition of overcrowding in 
Rhodes did not deprive inmates of basic necessities, such as food, medical care, safety or 
sanitation, the totality of the conditions did not violate the Eighth Amendment. ld. 
96ld. at 347. The Court did not rely on the totality approach, but instead weighed the 
cumulative conditions in the prison against the punishment and the unnecessary infliction 
of pain. ld. In contrast, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion outlined the intricacies of the 
totality approach. See id. at 362-64 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
971d. at 346. For further discussion on the intricacies of the totality approach, especially 
prior to Rhodes, see Deborah A. Montick, Comment, Challenging Cruel and Unusual Conditions 
of Confinement: Refining the Totality of Conditions Approach, 26 How. L.J. 227 (1982) (arguing 
courts must continue to employ the totality approach in order to review comprehensively 
the unconstitutional conditions affecting state prisons and to counter the neglect by state 
legislatures). 
98 Rhodes, 452 V.S. at 363 n.l0 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
99 See generally Robert M. Lapinsky, Note, Prison Conditions: The Eighth Amendment Standard 
of the Remedial Authority of Judges, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1387 (1989) (discussing the D.C. 
Circuit's acceptance of the totality of the circumstances test); Charlene W. Christofiles, Note, 
Schrader v. White: Fourth Circuit Rejects Totality Analysis for Cruel and Unusual Conditions of 
Confinement, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 701 (1986) (discussing the Fourth Circuit's rejection of 
the totality approach); Neil W. Head, Note, Totality of the Circumstances Standard Applied to 
Prison Overcrowding-Jackson v. Hendricks, 59 TEM. L.Q. 589 (1985) (discussing the Third 
Circuit's acceptance of the totality approach as the correct standard to determine whether 
conditions violate the Eighth Amendment); Reynolds, supra note 93 (arguing that the Ninth 
Circuit has rejected the totality approach). 
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amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation. loo Other courts re-
jected the totality approach and instead focused on each of the 
challenged conditions separately.IOI 
When ruling on a district court's application of the totality 
approach in Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the use of the totality of condi-
tions test. 102 The D.C. Circuit was specific in defining what an inmate 
must show; it was the identification of deprivations, not deficiencies, 
that was essential in finding a constitutional violation under the 
totality of the conditions approach.103 The Fifth Circuit also utilized 
and supported the totality approach. I04 In Stewart v. Winter, the 
court held "[t]he legal test for an Eighth Amendment challenge to 
conditions of one's confinement, although imprecise, is well settled: 
the court must consider the 'totality' of the conditions to determine 
whether they violate contemporary standards of decency."I05 In 
support of this proposition, the court cited Rhodes as adopting the 
totality test by implication. 106 
The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the use of the totality 
approach. In Hoptowit v. Ray, the court heard allegations that 
100 See, e.g., Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 426-27 (3d Cir. 1990) (examined the totality 
of the conditions within the prison when determining whether conditions of confinement 
violated the Eighth Amendment), cm. denied, 112 S. Ct. 343 (1991); Inmates of Occoquan v. 
Barry, 844 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding the court must identify conditions which, either 
alone or taken together, violate the Eighth Amendment); Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d 47, 
50 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding numerous deficient conditions, considered together, constitute a 
claim under § 1983); Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 335-37 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding the 
court must consider the "totality" of the conditions to determine whether an Eighth Amend-
ment violation exists). 
101 See, e.g., Schrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1985) (rejected use of totality 
approach and instead analyzed each factor separately); Smith v. Fairman, 690 F.2d 122, 125 
(7th Cir. 1982) (rejected totality approach because "vague conclusions that totality of condi-
tions amount to a constitutional violation are insufficient"), cm. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983); 
Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982) (applied single condition analysis and rejected 
totality approach). 
102 884 F.2d 828, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
lOS Id. at 839-40. The majority felt that deficiencies were merely conditions that fell short 
of the norm, and that they were not a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. In order to 
constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights, the conditions had to be more than undesir-
able or deficient; they had to amount to a complete denial of basic necessities. Id. Thus, 
deficiencies, even in combination, did not rise to the level of Eighth Amendment violations. 
However, deprivations, either alone or in combination, could rise to the level of Eighth 
Amendment violations. The dissent, however, argued that the term "deficiency" was simply 
"shorthand for constitutional violations of deprivations." Id. at 849 n.21 (Greene, J., dissent-
ing). 
104 See Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 335 (5th Cir. 1982). 
105Id. 
I06Id. at 335-36 n.17 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981». 
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conditions in isolation, segregation and protective custody cells in a 
Washington state prison constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment. I07 Whereas the district court concluded that any particular 
condition violated the Eighth Amendment solely because it contrib-
uted to the totality of the conditions, the appeals court specifically 
rejected the totality approach. lOS The court held that "there is not 
an Eighth Amendment violation if each of the basic needs is sepa-
rately met."I09 Thus, in the Ninth Circuit prior to Wil50n v. Seiter, 
courts had to consider each condition in the prison and determine 
whether the condition amounted to a deprivation in the areas man-
dated by the Eighth Amendment. llo Without a deprivation of a. 
basic human need, no totality of the conditions could result in a 
constitutional violation. II I 
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court's holdings in Wil50n v. Seiter, 
lower courts both rejected and accepted the use of the totality 
approach. In Wil5on, the Supreme Court addressed the prisoner's 
claim that a court cannot dismiss any single challenged condition 
because each condition must be "considered as part of the overall 
conditions challenged."ll2 The majority in Wil5on, however, con-
cluded that Rhodes v. Chapman had not established the broad prop-
osition that each condition must only be considered as part of the 
overall conditions challenged. ll3 Wil50n rejected the notion that 
"overall conditions" can rise to the level of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need ex-
ists. ll4 Instead, the Court held that some conditions of confinement 
may establish an Eighth Amendment violation "in combination" 
107 Hoptowit, 682 F.2d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 1982). 
108 [d. at 1246 (holding "courts may not find [Eighth Amendment] violations based on 
the 'totality of conditions' at a prison"). 
109 [d. at 1246-47. 
llO [d. at 1247. 
III The analysis applied in Hoptowit was later labeled as the "core conditions test" in 
David J. Gottlieb, The Legacy of Wolfish and Chapman: Some Thoughts About "Big Prison Case" 
Litigation in the 1980s, in PRISONERS AND THE LAw 2, 2-18 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1990). Under 
the core conditions test, the Eighth Amendment is violated when a prisoner is deprived of 
at least one of the "core conditions" - adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical 
care, and personal safety. See Russell W. Gray, Note, Wilson v. Seiter: Defining the Components 
of and Proposing a Direction for Eighth Amendment Prison Condition Law, 41 AM. U.L. REv. 1339, 
1352-54 (1992). 
ll2 Wilson v. Seiter, III S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (1991). The prisoner based his argument on 
the Court's observation in Rhodes v. Chapman that conditions of confinement, alone or in 
combination, must be considered as part of the overall conditions challenged. [d. (citing 
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). 
lIS Wilson, III S. Ct. at 2327. 
ll4 [d. 
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when and "only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that 
produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need."1I5 
The Supreme Court has now established a new application of 
the totality of the conditions approach. The Court rejected the 
notion that conditions should always be analyzed in isolation, while 
at the same time limited that use of the totality approach. Contested 
conditions can be evaluated in combination, but only when depri-
vations of a "single, identifiable human need" can be illustrated. 116 
Although the Court did clarify how to apply the totality approach, 
by actually limiting its use, the Court may be making the identifi-
cation of deprivations which exist in prisons more difficult. How-
ever, the Court could have simply dismissed the notion of analyzing 
conditions in combination. If it had, prisoners would only have been 
able to analyze each condition separately and would have been faced 
with a stricter burden of proof. Because the Court did not com-
pletely dismiss this approach, it appears, as with its additional re-
quirement of deliberate indifference, that the Court is defining new 
approaches which may be stricter, but which still allow inmates to 
raise Eighth Amendment claims. 
A recent Fourth Circuit decision illustrates the impact of the 
"single, identifiable human need" requirement as set forth in Wil-
son. ll7 In Williams v. Griffin, a prisoner alleged that his Eighth 
Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment had 
been violated as a result of prison overcrowding combined with 
unsanitary conditions. lIB The point of disagreement between the 
parties was whether or not the totality of conditions approach could 
combine to show an Eighth Amendment violation. llg The court 
1I5 [d. In its reasoning, the Court set forth "a low cell temperature at night in combination 
with a failure to issue blankets" as an example of when conditions could be evaluated "in 
combination." /d. 
116 [d. Interestingly, the concurrence did not mention the majority's interpretation of the 
totality test in its opinion. In addition, the "single, identifiable human need" requirement is 
arguably an adoption of the core conditions test. See Gray, supra note Ill, at 1362-63. 
117 See generally Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1991). 
118 [d. at 821. The prisoner alleged that the prison was unconstitutionally overcrowded, 
with twelve persons in a cell that measured approximately twenty feet by twenty feet and 
was designed to hold only four inmates. [d. In addition, his complaint alleged unsanitary 
conditions, including one toilet bowl for the twelve cell mates which was "constantly coated 
with urine day and night," four showers for approximately 96 inmates, and unsanitary and 
deficient plumbing systems which flooded floors with sewage. [d. at 821-22. 
119/d. at 824. The prison officials contended that a totality of the circumstances approach 
could not be utilized to show an Eighth Amendment violation because a state's provision of 
basic necessities ends its obligation under the Eighth Amendment. [d. The prisoner alleged 
that serious overcrowding, when combined with other substandard conditions of confine-
ment, unconstitutionally deprived an inmate of basic human needs. [d. 
1993] PRISON CONDITION STANDARDS 175 
stated that many cases support the proposition that a totality of 
conditions can be combined to show an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion. 120 This court found, however, the Wilson v. Seiter had narrowed 
the totality of the conditions approach. 121 The Williams court applied 
the use of the totality approach as defined in Wilson, and held that 
the prisoner in this case must "demonstrate that the overcrowding, 
in light of overall prison conditions, deprived him of a specific 
human need."122 Williams illustrates that the new totality approach 
derived from Wilson v. Seiter will be one prisoners can overcome, so 
long as an identifiable human need is being deprived. 
Wilson clarified both the unresolved division over the need for 
an intent requirement and the application of the totality approach 
for the lower courts. How the decision in Wilson will affect prison 
condition cases in the future and how courts will apply the new 
standard of deliberate indifference is not as clearly defined. 
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WILSON V. SEITER 
Although Wilson may have clarified the legal test to be applied 
in prison condition claims of cruel and unusual punishment, the 
question remains whether deliberate indifference will be an effec-
tive and fair standard in its application. 
A. Judicial Intervention Within the Prison System 
One potential problem presented by the Court's holding in 
Wilson is whether prisoners will be able to obtain relief when in-
humane conditions exist in correctional institutions. Over the past 
twenty years, courts have taken a more active role in structuring 
remedies for prison condition cases. 123 Forty-one states, the District 
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands currently have 
prisons or their entire prison systems operating under a court order 
120 [d. at 824 (cases omitted). 
121 [d. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (holding conditions of confinement 
can only be combined when resulting in the deprivation of a single, identifiable human 
need)). 
122 Williams, 952 F.2d at 824-25. The Fourth Circuit found that the allegations in the 
prisoner's complaint did raise a genuine issue with respect to unsanitary conditions and 
overcrowding. [d. at 825. Williams v. Griffin did not, however, define exactly what would 
constitute a specific human need. See also Gray, supra note Ill, at 1384-86 (discussing the 
types of human needs the courts mayor may not recognize). 
123 Traditionally, courts were reluctant to intervene in the administration of state prisons. 
See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
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or consent decree designed to help regulate and correct the con-
ditions of those prisons. 124 The Wilson decision may result in a 
decrease in this type of judicial activism. 
On the one hand, many argue that judicial intervention in state 
and federal prison systems has been a positive development. The 
need for judicial intervention may not be immediately apparent, 
but several important factors put prisoners at a distinct disadvantage 
in fighting for their rights and in obtaining support for prison 
reform. First, public apathy contributes to the pervasive neglect of 
prisons in the United States. Often, the public is not even made 
aware of prison conditions, and if it is, the public frequently lacks 
the desire to correct these conditions. 125 Not only are prison inmates 
politically unpopular and socially threatening, but prisoners are 
without the power to vote. 126 Most prisoners are also without the 
monetary funds needed to wage a political battle or to hire a private 
attorney. In addition, prisoners do not have regular access to 
phones, fax machines, xerox machines, legal resources, or lobbying 
assistance that they need to organize support for their cause. Fur-
thermore, prison officials are often caught in the middle when state 
legislatures refuse to spend "sufficient tax dollars to bring condi-
tions in outdated prisons up to minimally acceptable standards."127 
Conditions may need to be improved, but money may not always 
be allocated to correct them. In fact, some prison administrators 
have admitted that they do not like the present conditions in their 
prisons and that they actually welcome law suits which may force 
the state to put more money into making prison life more hu-
mane. 128 
Because prisoners are unable to fight for their rights on their 
own, and because officials' hands are often tied, a limited amount 
124 See Lynn S. Branham, When are Prison Conditions Cruel and Unusual?, PREVo OF U.S. S. 
CT. CASES, Feb. 19, 1991, at 201. 
125 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 358 (1981) (Brennan, j., concurring). 
126 See id. at 358-59 (citing Morris, The Snail's Pace of Prison Reform, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 100TH ANNUAL CONGRESS OF CORRECTIONS OF THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCI-
ATION 36, 42 (1970». 
127 See Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648, 654 (D.C. Md. 1978). In Johnson, the court 
recognized that state legislatures are subjected to great pressures from many sides to allocate 
public funds for purposes which will benefit the tax-paying citizens of the state. 450 F. Supp. 
at 654. The court also found, however, that no matter how heinous the prisoners' crimes 
may have been, the prisoners are "human beings possessing rights recognized by the Con-
stitution and by decisions of the Supreme Court." Id. 
128 See Stuart Taylor, Locked Up in Jail, Locked Out of Court, LEGAL TIMES, June 24, 1992, 
at 27. 
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of judicial intervention is arguably warranted in protecting the 
health and safety of prisoners. Federal courts need to remain avail-
able to prisoners who feel that their constitutional rights have been 
violated. Under these circumstances, courts arguably have emerged 
as a critical force behind efforts to ameliorate inhumane conditions, 
as they are insulated from political pressure and have a duty to 
enforce prisoners' minimal constitutional rights at a modest or at a 
significant financial cost. 129 
Some people, however, do not perceive judicial intervention in 
the area of prison reform to be a positive development. As ex-
plained in Rhodes v. Chapman, the Supreme Court itself does not 
want the judiciary to usurp the task of running prisons because the 
running of prisons should be entrusted to state legislatures and 
prison administrators, not to the courts.130 Up until two decades 
ago, the judiciary did not play a significant role in prison reform. 
The courts followed the "hands-off" doctrine, leaving decisions and 
policy-making almost entirely up to legislatures and prison offi-
cials. 131 In general, those who do not support judicial intervention 
feel that prison decisions and the punishment of prisoners should 
be left to state legislatures and prison administrators, not to the 
courts that do not deal with prison issues on a day-to-day basis. 132 
Still others who do not support judicial intervention feel that pris-
oners should not be afforded protection by the courts because they 
gave up their rights upon prosecution and because tax money 
should not be spent on prisoners who are no longer viewed as a 
productive part of society. 
Although forceful arguments can be made both for and against 
judicial intervention in the prison reform process, courts have en-
deavored actively to correct unconstitutional violations in United 
States prisons since the late 1960s, and there is every indication that 
129 See generally j.C.K., Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison 
Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841 (1971) (discussing the abandonment of the hands-off doctrine in 
order to correct the problems of prison life). 
130 452 U.S. 337, 354 (1981) (Brennan, j., concurring). 
131 The hands-off doctrine represents a denial of jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
petitions from prisoners alleging some form of mistreatment or contesting some deprivation 
suffered during imprisonment. See generally Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique 
of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.j. 506 (1963) (discussing and 
criticizing the hands-off doctrine prior to judicial activism within the court system). 
132 /d. at 508-09. Judicial review of administrative decisions can be seen as subverting 
the authority of prison officials, the discipline of the prisons, and the efforts of prison 
administrations to accomplish the objectives of the system which is entrusted to their care. 
[d. 
178 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORW LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13: 155 
they must continue to do so at some level. 133 Prison conditions are 
scandalous, with inmates frequently subjected to filth, overcrowd-
ing, and incessant violence. 134 Although the Constitution does not 
mandate comfortable prisons, the Supreme Court and lower courts 
have all recognized that inmates are to be afforded minimal decen-
cies of life and basic human needs. 135 
In 1990, the Third Circuit reviewed a case illustrating just how 
desperate prison conditions can become in the United States. 136 In 
Tillery v. Owens, the court found that "most inmates spend 14 hours 
a day in their cells" and "some must spend 21 to 22 hours a day in 
their cells for as long as four consecutive weeks."137 Because these 
cells are "so tiny, only one inmate at a time can stand in the cell; 
the other must lie on the bed."138 Despite the small size of the cell 
and inadequate light for reading, twenty to twenty-five percent of 
the inmates were afraid to leave their cells because they feared 
physical assault. 139 Among many other things, "bed bugs and mice 
are epidemic," as are "mites, fieas and lice."14o Conditions "are 
unsanitary and dangerous," "ventilation is grossly inadequate," and 
"plumbing is inadequate."141 Finally, toilets in the affected cells "are 
unsuitable, resulting in the accumulation of human waste for as 
long as 2 days."142 
Tillery presents a graphic picture of recent proof that courts 
must remain an important tool for the correction of unconstitu-
133 See generally Susan Strum, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Interven-
tion in Prisons, 138 V. PA. L. REV. 805 ( 1990) (exploring the dynamics of judicial intervention 
in prison systems). 
134 Prisons' Unusual, Unintended Cruelties, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 1991, at C18. The popu-
lation of V nited States prisons and jails has nearly doubled since 1980 to over one million 
inmates, giving this country the "world's highest rate of incarceration [which is 1 fast outpacing 
efforts to add new cells." Taylor, supra note 128. 
135 Wilson v. Seiter, III S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 V.S. 
337, 347-49 (1981». 
136 See Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990), eert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 343 (1991) 
(holding the alleged conditions of confinement at the prison in question amounted to un-
constitutional cruel and unusual punishment). 
137Id. at 422. 
138/d. Because of overcrowding, there was also "a shortage of basic supplies such as 
underwear, jackets, towels and bedding." Id. at 423. Inmates were forced to "borrow" these 
items from other inmates, paying for them with either usurious interest rates or sexual 
favors.Id. 
139Id. at 422. Much of the insecurity was due to understaffing. Between 1984 and 1988, 
an average of 97 assaults were reported each year, but many more assaults and thefts went 
unreported. Id. 
14°Id. at 423. 
141Id. 
142Id. 
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tional deprivations which remain rooted within the United States 
prison system. It is arguable, however, that few claims will be suc-
cessful if the definition of deliberate indifference is strictly con-
strued by the lower courts. If the standard is not strictly construed, 
prison inmates may have a chance to continue fighting for condi-
tions they believe may be cruel and unusual. 
B. Defining and Applying the Standard of Deliberate Indifference 
Deliberate indifference has rapidly become an established stan-
dard for evaluating officials' conduct in civil rights litigation. It has 
been employed in prisoner medical care cases,143 municipal liability 
claims of inadequate training,144 and for some due process claims. 145 
Although Wilson expanded the deliberate indifference standard to 
include prison condition cases, it did not attempt to define delib-
erate indifference, leaving this up to the lower courts to work out 
on a case by case basis. For this reason, discrepancies will probably 
continue to exist among the lower courts. In addition, depending 
on the definition set by the lower courts, the deliberate indifference 
standard may also prove to be particularly harsh when actually 
applied in prison condition cases. 
Past case law interpreting Eighth Amendment decisions illus-
trates the various definitions which may be applied among the lower 
courts. The possible interpretations courts may assign to deliberate 
indifference can be divided into four categories: 146 
1. Knowledge of harmful conditions and a failure to act on that 
knowledge; 147 
143 See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (l976). 
144 City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204-05 (1989) (holding inadequate 
training of police may serve as a basis for § 1983 municipal liability only where failure to 
train police results in deliberate indifference to rights of people with whom the police come 
in contact). 
145 See I MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, 
DEFENSES AND FEES 121-29 (2d ed. 1991). 
146 Gray, supra note Ill, at 1368-78 (assigning and discussing the four potential defini-
tions of deliberate indifference). 
147 See Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495-96 (lOth Cir. 1990) (finding an 
official or municipality acts with deliberate indifference if the conduct or policy disregards 
known or obvious risks that are likely to result in the violation of prisoners' constitutional 
rights). Rather than calling for a strong showing of intent, this interpretation requires only 
a showing of actual knowledge of serious harm and subsequent failure to act on the harm. 
Gray, supra note Ill, at 1368-69. 
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2. Inexcusable lack of knowledge; 148 
3. Recklessness; 149 or 
4. Repeated negligent acts or systematic and gross deficien-
cies. ISO 
As discussed earlier, the decision in Wilson clarified the analysis to 
be used in cruel and unusual punishment cases-both objective and 
subjective components must be proven. The Court's decision in 
Wilson, however, merely shifted the focus of the lower court debate 
to the actual definition of the standard now used to evaluate the 
intent of prison officials. 
How the intent requirement of deliberate indifference is to 
affect prisoners' claims of cruel and unusual prison conditions will 
be determined by the exact definition applied by each lower court. 
Each of the four identified interpretations have different implica-
tions, and the precise definitions applied in the lower courts will 
affect the impact of the new intent requirement established in Wil-
son. If the courts assign a definition of criminal recklessness to 
deliberate indifference, a prisoner will have a much higher burden 
of proof. If a court holds out the definition to be that of systematic 
and gross deficiencies, however, the prisoner's burden in proving 
deliberate indifference will be lessened, as this definition does 
not specifically call into question the intent of the prison officials. 
In addition, if courts are to assign definitions which require an 
I.B Recklessness, as a definition, indicates that actual knowledge of a condition is not 
necessary to prove deliberate indifference. See Gray, supra note 111, at 1371-76. Actual 
knowledge may not be required in at least two situations. First, when officials purposefully 
shield themselves from knowledge of severe conditions, this purposeful shielding may be 
used to infer knowledge. Id. Second, an official's lack of knowledge of deprivations may be 
so offensive that it rises to the level of deliberate indifference. Id. 
149 See, e.g., Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 221 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding a prisoner must 
prove that the official's action was deliberate or reckless in a criminal sense to show deliberate 
indifference); Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984) (equating deliberate indif-
ference with reckless disregard); Layne v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 474 (lst Cir. 1982). Courts 
have used two major levels of recklessness to define deliberate indifference. Gray, supra note 
III, at 1372-76. Some courts have concluded that conduct only reaches the level of deliberate 
indifference when it is criminally reckless. Id. at 1373-74. Other courts have interpreted 
deliberate indifference in Eighth Amendment cases to be closer to tortious recklessness. Id. 
at 1275-76. 
150 See, e.g., Degidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 533 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding an official's 
deliberate indifference may be proven by evidence of repeated negligent acts of systematic 
deficiencies); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding systematic 
deficiencies can provide the basis for a finding of deliberate indifference); French v. Owens, 
777 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding deliberate indifference can be illustrated through 
repeated negligent acts or systematic deficiencies), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986); Bishop 
v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224, 1225-26 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding a series of incidents closely 
related in time may disclose a pattern of conduct by prison officials amounting to deliberate 
indifference to the medical needs of prison inmates). 
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inexcusable lack of knowledge, the prisoner may only have to prove 
deliberate indifference by demonstrating that the officials "should 
have known" about the conditions and acted upon them. 
The most effective way to analyze the effect of the deliberate 
indifference standard on prisoner's claims of cruel and unusual 
punishment is to examine recent lower court decisions applying the 
standards set out in Wilson. By analyzing these cases, it will become 
clear whether the judiciary can continue to intervene and correct 
cruel and unusual prison conditions under the Wilson standard or 
whether the deliberate indifference standard is truly an unsur-
mountable obstacle to judicial reform. I51 
In cases subsequent to Wilson, the First Circuit has supported 
the stricter definition of deliberate indifference, that of criminal 
recklessness. I52 In DesRosiers v. Moran, the court held that deliberate 
indifference may be manifested by an official's response to an in-
mate's known needs, or by denial, delay, or interference. I53 The 
court went on to find that, while deliberate indifference can aptly 
be described as recklessness, "it is recklessness not in the tort-law 
sense but in the stricter criminal-law sense, requiring actual knowl-
edge of impending harm, easily preventable."154 Although this 
court's definition of deliberate indifference was discussed in the 
context of an alleged failure to provide adequate medical care, in 
light of the equation of "conditions of confinement" to medical 
conditions in the Wilson decision,I55 it is reasonable to assume that 
this definition of deliberate indifference from prison medical cases 
will carryover to prison condition cases in the First Circuit. In 
addition, in McGill v. Duckworth I56 and James v. Milwaukee County,I57 
the Seventh Circuit also defined deliberate indifference as criminal 
recklessness. 
In a recent Fourth Circuit case, deliberate indifference was not 
as strictly defined. I58 In Williams v. Griffin, the court held that the 
151 This was one of the ultimate fears of the concurrence in Wilson v. Seiter: the concur-
rence felt that serious deprivations of basic human needs would go unredressed because of 
the search for deliberate indifference. III S. Ct. 2321, 2331 (1991) (White, j., concurring). 
152 See DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991). 
153Id. 
154Id. 
155 III S. Ct. at 2326 (finding no significant distinction between claims alleging inade-
quate medical care and those alleging inadequate conditions of confinement). 
156 944 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1991). 
157 956 F.2d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 1992) (defining deliberate indifference as "recklessness in 
a criminal, subjective sense: disregarding a risk of danger so substantial that knowledge of 
the danger can be inferred"). 
158 See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1991). 
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prisoner "must show that the Prison Officials had knowledge of the 
conditions that are the subject of the complaint."159 In addition, the 
court held that "once prison officials become aware of a problem 
with prison conditions, they cannot simply ignore the problem, but 
should take corrective action when warranted."160 This circuit is 
applying the definition requiring knowledge of a deprivation with 
a failure to act upon that knowledge. As a result of inspection 
reports documenting the inhumane conditions of confinement and 
the numerous other complaints by inmates, the court held that 
sufficient evidence was presented from which the inference of de-
liberate indifference could be drawn. 161 
The Fifth Circuit applied a similar definition of the deliberate 
indifference standard in Alberti v. Texas-deliberate indifference can 
be found "where prison officials were aware of objectively cruel 
conditions but failed to remedy them."162 The Fifth Circuit, prior 
to Wilson, had held that intent was not an element of a cause of 
action alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement. 163 In 
arriving at its definition of deliberate indifference after the Wilson 
decision, the Fifth Circuit found that the new deliberate indiffer-
ence requirement of Wilson was not wholly separate from the ob-
jective requirement. 164 The Fifth Circuit then held that the pris-
oners satisfied the requirement of deliberate indifference because 
little doubt existed that both the county and the state knew that the 
conditions of confinement in the jails deprived the inmates of basic 
needs and because no discernable reason was presented for the 
prison officials' delays in correcting the conditions. 165 
These cases illustrate a division which continues among the 
lower courts. This time, the debate centers around the precise 
15gld. at 826. In this case, the prison officials contended that the prisoner failed to 
demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute with respect to the deliberate indifference of 
the officials. Id. The prisoner, however, insisted that once the officials were put on notice 
through several published reports by the Governor and Legislature of North Carolina re-
garding the deplorable conditions of the prison, they were required to make a reasonable 
response. Id. 
16°ld. 
1611d. at 826-27. Thus, the summary judgment in favor of the prison officials was 
reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. [d. 
162 937 F.2d 984, 998 (5th Cir. 1991). The prisoner complained of overcrowding and 
serious problems with the jail's plumbing, ventilation, fire, safety, supplies, food service, and 
medical care. Id. at 686-89. 
163 See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's require-
ments prior to Wilson). 
164 Alberti, 937 F.2d at 998. 
1651d. at 998-99. 
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definition of deliberate indifference, rather than the exact standard 
to measure Eighth Amendment claims. The effect of Wilson will, in 
part, be measured by the definitions each circuit assigns to delib-
erate indifference. Although the definitions will vary, the essential 
standard of deliberate indifference does not appear to be impossible 
for prisoners to satisfy. In both Williams v. Griffin and Alberti v. Texas, 
the prisoners were successful in illustrating that the officials had 
possibly acted with deliberate indifference. 166 In addition, Elizabeth 
Alexander, deputy director of the American Civil Liberties Union's 
National Prison Project, admitted that, while she was disappointed 
with the Court's ruling in Wilson, "the deliberate indifference stan-
dard is one we can live with."167 Other lawyers representing pris-
oners have echoed this assessment, saying that although the delib-
erate indifference standard was a setback, it is one they will likely 
be able to meet. 168 Finally, those persons and groups representing 
prisoners were generally relieved that the Court did not instead 
choose the higher standard of intent set out in Whitley v. Albers. This 
standard would have required proof of "malicious and sadistic" 
behavior on the part of prison officials and would have been more 
difficult to prove than the standard of deliberate indifference. 
Thus, although it may be more difficult to prove that conditions 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment with the addition of an 
intent requirement, it appears as though prisoners will still be able 
to successfully raise Eighth Amendment claims and courts will still 
be able to maintain constitutional requirements of basic human 
needs within the prison system. The "cost defense," however, is 
another possible barrier to cruel and unusual punishment claims. 
C. The "Cost Defense" 
With the establishment of the need to prove deliberate indif-
ference, those concerned with how the Wilson decision will affect 
prison condition cases have also focused their attention on the role 
of the "cost defense" under the new standard. The Wilson court 
stated that "whether [conduct] can be characterized as 'wanton' 
depends upon the constraints facing the official."169 Thus, it is pos-
sible that the state of mind requirement will prompt prison officials 
166 See supra notes 158-161 and 162-165 and accompanying text. 
167 See Marcus, supra note 19. 
168 See Linda Greenehouse,justices Restrict Suits Challenging Prison Conditions, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 1991, at AI. 
169 Wilson v. Seiter, III S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991) (emphasis added). 
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to assert that fiscal constraints beyond their control, rather than 
their own personal indifference, acted as a constraint and prevented 
them from rectifying the inhumane conditions. Whether or not this 
defense is allowed to be raised will impact the outcome of prison 
condition cases after Wilson. 170 
Although the concurrence in Wilson was concerned about the 
effect of the cost defense, the majority was unimpressed. The ma-
jority stressed the importance of the intent requirement, and felt 
that the Court's decision to require a showing of intent could not 
be ignored or followed simply based on a policy consideration such 
as the cost defense.l7i Although the majority opinion mentioned 
the cost defense, it failed to address directly how this defense would 
affect an inmate's case as "the defendants failed to raise it [in this 
case]."172 Apparently, the majority did not want this defense inter-
fering with its opinion. 
The concurrence felt that the majority's approach was "unwise" 
as it left open the possibility that prison officials will be able to 
defeat a § 1983 action by showing that the conditions were caused 
by insufficient funding rather than by any deliberate indifference 
on the part of the prison officials. 173 By leaving the legitimacy of 
this defense unanswered, the concurrence feared that the majority 
opinion would undermine the correction of serious deprivations of 
basic human needs in prisons. 174 Therefore, this issue was left un-
resolved, and the determination as to how to weigh the cost defense 
was left to the discretion of the lower courts. 
Once again, there is no uniform agreement among the courts 
on this defense. The Sixth Circuit indicated in Birrell v. Brown that 
it would accept a defense by prison officials based on budgetary 
constraints. 175 In Birrell, the appellate court cited a Supreme Court 
case for the proposition that budgetary constraints could, in certain 
instances, cloak an individual with good-faith immunity.176 The 
Sixth Circuit went on to say that such immunity based on budgetary 
170 If this defense is raised successfully, the officials would be immune from any liability 
arising under a § 1983 claim. 
171 Wilson, III S. Ct. at 2326. 
172 Id. 
173Id. at 2330-31 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
174Id. at 2331. 
175 897 F.2d 956, 958-59 (6th Cir. 1989). In Birrell, the prisoner alleged that the entire 
institution in which he was imprisoned was understaffed and overcrowded. Id. at 956-57. 
176Id. at 959 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (indicating a profes-
sional, sued in his individual capacity, will not be liable for damages if he or she was unable 
to satisfy normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints)). 
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constraints could not excuse the constitutional violations themselves 
or foreclose a court from issuing orders requiring the government 
to correct the deficiencies. 177 Although the Sixth Circuit's applica-
tion of the cost defense in Birrell indicated only a limited acceptance 
of the cost defense, the court stated that the prison official might 
somehow be directly responsible for the alleged deprivation, "but 
only if he was not hampered by budgetary constraints."178 The court 
went on to find that the prisoner failed to allege that the prison 
official did anything other than the "best that he could do" with the 
money provided by the legislature, and that it appeared that the 
official was confronted with a situation over which he could not 
exercise as much control as might be desired due to lack of funds. 179 
Other courts have not been as receptive to the cost defense. 
The Ninth,180 Eleventh,l8l and Seventhl82 Circuits have each found 
deliberate indifference over a defendant's claim of inadequate fund-
ing. In Harris v. Thigpen, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that sys-
tematic deficiencies in medical care may be related to a lack of funds 
allocated to prisons by the state legislature. 183 The court found, 
however, that such a lack of funds would not excuse a failure on 
the part of correctional systems to maintain a certain minimum level 
of medical services necessary to avoid the imposition of cruel and 
unusual punishment. 184 Although the Harris case dealt with medical 
care in prisons, the court's decision naturally extends to prison 
conditions cases as well. The intent standard in both types of cases 
is that of deliberate indifference, and both types of cases turn on 
the maintenance by prison authorities of conditions necessary to 
satisfy an inmate's basic needs. 
A recent Fifth Circuit case decided after Wilson provides an 
example of the possible effect of the cost defense on prison condi-
177 Birrell, 867 F.2d at 958-99. 
178 [d. at 959-60 (emphasis added). 
179 [d. The court then held that the official was entitled to qualified immunity. [d. at 960. 
180 See Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding budgetary constraints 
do not justify cruel and unusual punishment). 
181 See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1509-10 (lith Cir. 1991) (finding a lack of 
funds will not excuse the failure of correctional systems to maintain a certain minimum level 
of medical services); Ancata v. Prison Health Servo Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(finding a lack of funds for facilities cannot justify an unconstitutional lack of competent 
medical care and treatment for inmates). 
182 See Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1983) (recognizing many prison 
deficiencies are related to a lack of funds, but finding a certain minimum level of medical 
service must be maintained to prevent cruel and unusual punishment). 
183 941 F.2d at 1509. 
184 [d. 
186 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:155 
tion cases. Prior to Wilson, it was well established in the Fifth Circuit 
that constitutional standards may not be frustrated by legislative 
inaction or by failure to provide necessary funds. 185 In Alberti v. 
Texas, a case decided after Wilson, the Fifth Circuit briefly discussed 
the issue of whether inadequate funding could constitutionally ex-
cuse the perpetuation of otherwise invalid conditions of confine-
ment. 186 Although the court did not directly address the defense 
because the record did not offer substantial evidence that the state's 
actions were constrained by funding, the Fifth Circuit did find that 
"the issue is assured currency by the intent requirement of Seiter 
and that opinion's leave of it."187 The Fifth Circuit's interpretation 
of Wilson indicates that, although the defense would not be welcome 
in that circuit, the debate surrounding whether it is an acceptable 
defense is very much alive after Wilson. 
The effect of the cost defense will depend on the weight it is 
given by the lower courts. When proving deliberate indifference, 
the cost defense could become a serious interference in those cir-
cuits that do allow this defense to be raised. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Is the deck stacked against § 1983 claims of cruel and unusual 
punishment? Prisoners must now show not only that conditions are 
so egregious as to violate the Constitution, but also that prison 
officials knew about the deprivations and did not make efforts to 
relieve them. The standards established by Wilson v. Seiter may set 
a clearer test for lower courts to follow when analyzing cruel and 
unusual punishment claims. Much uncertainty remains, however, 
to be worked out in the lower courts, including the definition of 
185 See, e.g., Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding inadequate 
funding will not excuse the perpetration of unconstitutional conditions of confinement); 
Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1319-20 (5th Cir. 1974) (same). 
186 937 F.2d 984, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1991). 
187Id. at 1000. In addition, the Alberti court stated that the record in this case left it 
skeptical about the assertion that a recalcitrant legislature is the culprit. Id. This raises an 
issue that is beyond the scope of this Note-whether or not prisoners can base their cruel 
and unusual punishment claims on the collective culpability of all state officials, including 
the legislatures which vote to lock up more people while refusing to appropriate the money 
needed to avoid subjecting prisoners to inhumane or unconstitutional conditions. Although 
this claim may become a reality, two major barriers are present if this argument is to be 
successful. First, legislators must fit under the § 1983 "under the color of law" requirement. 
Second, it may be difficult to prove deliberate indifference on the part of state legislators 
because they will never be present to "see" or "know" whether money is needed to correct 
conditions. 
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deliberate indifference, the viability of the "cost defense," and the 
establishment of a "single, identifiable human need." The test es-
tablished in Wil50n may prove to be a workable standard if lower 
courts do not define deliberate indifference too strictly and if the 
cost defense is not a barrier. Only time will tell if the lower courts 
will interpret and apply Wil50n so that inhumane conditions are not 
allowed to prevail over the claims of prisoners. 
Candace Ada Mueller 

